In November 2008, the Federal Reserve announced the first of a series of unconventional monetary policies, which would include asset purchases and forward guidance, to reduce longterm interest rates. We investigate the behavior of shorts, considered sophisticated investors, before and after FOMC announcements not fully anticipated in spot bond markets. Short interest in Treasury and agency securities declined prior to expansionary announcements, indicating shorts anticipated these surprises, and declined further after these announcements. The failure of shorts to reinstitute their positions after the last purchase announcement confirms that the Fed convinced sophisticated investors that interest rates would remain low.
Introduction
The collapse of international housing prices in 2006-2008 produced extreme credit market disturbances that culminated in the September 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a major investment bank, and a severe downturn in real economic activity. In response, the Federal Reserve (Fed) initiated a variety of emergency unconventional measures to stabilize the global economy.
The unconventional actions included "forward guidance" about the path of the federal funds rate target and a series of announcements of asset purchases that totaled several trillion dollars over the following ten years. Kohn (2009) Anecdotal evidence suggests that some sophisticated investors initiated short positions prior to the financial crisis to profit from it. 2 The Big Short (Lewis 2011 ) chronicles four such investors who predicted bond defaults that would be triggered by a credit and housing market collapse. Lewis (2011) suggests that at least a few individuals were discerning enough to foresee macro events, but it is also true that the counterparties were often other sophisticated institutions.
Using securities borrowing as a proxy for short interest, we empirically investigate whether shorts anticipated the Fed's announcements of QE1 bond purchases and how they reacted to those 2 moves. That is, we examine whether the Fed convinced sophisticated short investors that interest rates would remain low.
Specifically, we initially focus on four early and particularly surprising, expansionary announcements-labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4, in Figure 1 . At first, we focus on these announcements for most purposes because it should be easier to discern if shorts can predict large policy surprises, that is, important events that the marginal investor in spot and futures markets did not anticipate. Figure 1 shows the 10-year-Treasury yield and future price changes surrounding each of 21 events pertaining to FOMC statements, speeches or press releases or announcements associated with unconventional policy during the four phases. 3 For futures prices, the average change is $1.547 for the four announcements compared to $0.297 for all other announcements. These four announcements on which we focus have an average 10-year-Treasury yield change of 28.4 bps compared to an average of 6.9 bps for all other announcements. We later supplement our focus on these four announcement with a regression study on a broader sample of all 21 unconventional policy announcements shown in Figure 1 .
To presage our results, we find significant short covering prior to and following each asset purchase announcement. Short interest remained low throughout 2009 and early 2010, indicating that the Fed did convince shorts that interest rates would remain low. We find no difference in short covering at the times of the announcements for individual securities that the Fed purchased or not, suggesting that shorts either did not know or did not care which specific issues the Fed 3 The 10-year Treasury yields data are from Bloomberg and the change is the one-day change around the event. The futures price data are from Tickwrite quotes and the change is calculated based on the futures price 15 minutes before to 90 minutes after each announcement. Most events in Figure 1 have been previously studied in papers such as Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011) , Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) , Neely (2015) or Wright (2012) .
3 would purchase. These findings are consistent between the focused study of four events and the broader regression study of all 21 events.
We examine short interest because shorts have been shown to be sophisticated investors for whom data are available. Data on trades of other sophisticated investors such as hedge funds, mutual funds, and insiders are either not available or available only with delay. Predicting important monetary policy events-as opposed to earnings announcements, ratings or other types of news-is a particularly stringent test for shorts because shorts are attempting to out predict the marginal spot / futures investor in very deep markets with little or no private information. The minutes of FOMC meetings are released after three weeks and FOMC participants frequently publicly express their policy views, which are largely based on publicly available information. For example, Bernanke (2002) presaged the use of quantitative easing in the context of the Japanese economy, 6 years before it was attempted in the We focus on shorts who borrow securities in the securities lending market using Markit data because these data allow us to identify directly short sellers by using securities borrowing as a proxy. Further, these data are available daily and cover individual CUSIPs of both Treasuries and agencies.
There are at least three other ways to profit from falling bond prices-futures, using repurchase agreements (repos) to borrow securities to short, and credit default swaps (CDSs). But each of these has disadvantages for studying the behavior of shorts compared to our approach. Traders cannot, for example, use futures to short individual CUSIPs because many securities are potentially 4 deliverable on each futures contract. 5 Another difficulty with futures data is that separating the trades of short speculators from those of hedgers is problematic because these classifications are self-reported. Private conversations with industry participants suggest that these classifications are often unreliable.
Repos can also be used to borrow securities for short selling. However, data on repos for individual CUSIPs are not readily available. And repos are commonly used as a way of borrowing funds or upgrading collateral so that identifying which repos are used to borrow securities to short can be difficult.
Traders might benefit from falling bond prices due to deteriorating credit using CDSs, which are potentially available on individual CUSIPs for all types of securities. While purchasing CDSs is not directly comparable to shorting, the two strategies are likely to be highly correlated.
Because each channel has its own particular requirements, traders typically do not switch between these four ways of profiting from falling bond prices. 6 Participation in the securities lending market might require entering into the Overseas Securities Lending Agreement or the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement. Many institutions are prohibited from dealing in futures contract. To trade CDSs directly, institutions need an International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) master agreement, which might be difficult for smaller institutions to obtain.
Literature review
This paper unites two literatures: research that examines the characteristics and information content of short selling and research studying asset market reactions to unconventional monetary 5 One might argue that the cheapest to deliver is a single bond, but which bond is cheapest to deliver can change. 6 To some extent these limitations could be overcome by dealing through financial intermediaries.
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policy. This section briefly reviews these literatures to frame the unique contribution of the current paper.
The short selling literature
Short sellers are widely viewed as informed, sophisticated investors. In equity markets, short sales correctly predict negative returns (Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan 1998; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang 2008; Diether, Lee, and Werner 2009; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy 2007) , aid price discovery (Boehmer and Wu 2013) , and exploit profitable opportunities provided by downgrade announcements (Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh 2010) . Short sellers do not anticipate news, but have superior ability to process news (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg 2012) .
Although there is less study of shorting behavior in bond markets, researchers similarly find that short sellers adjust their portfolios prior to the release of useful information in fixed income markets. Nashikkar and Pedersen (2007) find short selling of corporate bonds increases before a rating downgrade, which indicates that certain investors anticipate the rating change. However, these authors cannot discern whether the increased short selling is due to private information, superior research ability, or whether prices react slowly to public information. Additionally, Hendershott, Kozhan, and Roman (2017) find that corporate bond shorts predict future bond returns. In contrast, Asquith, Au, Covert, and Pathak (2013) find that heavily-shorted corporate bonds do not earn abnormal returns, indicating that investors' private information does not motivate these short sales.
Literature related to unconventional monetary policy
By definition, bond yields can be decomposed into an expected future short rate and a term premium. The theoretical literature on unconventional monetary policy suggests several channels 6 by which such policies could influence yields through one of these components. The most widely cited channels are signaling, portfolio balance, and local supply (substitution) channels.
Signaling effects refer to the possibility that Fed announcements change expected future shortterm interest rates. That is, the Fed might commit to zero interest rates beyond its normal horizon, which Eggertsson (2006) refers to as "committing to be irresponsible." To the extent that signaling affects expected short yields, it should affect all bond yields, whether the Fed purchased those bonds or not.
Forward guidance presumably produces only signaling effects. The FOMC has offered forward guidance through at least five variations of "extended period" language to restrain expectations of policy rate hikes. Asset purchase announcements may both signal future interest rates and directly affect term premia. That is, asset purchases can signal a path for interest rates by changing the Fed's incentives to raise rates quickly in the future. A central bank with a large quantity of longmaturity bonds will incur capital losses when bond yields increase; this reduces the central bank's incentive to raise quickly policy rates (Bhattarai, Eggertsson, and Gafarov 2015) .
If short bonds were perfect substitutes for long bonds, then ex ante term premia would be zero and signaling would be the only active transmission channel; the Fed's unconventional policy could only affect long yields through the expected future short rate. Short bonds are imperfect substitutes for long bonds, however, and therefore the Fed's unconventional policy actions can also affect the term premia on bonds through the portfolio balance channel (Tobin 1958) . This channel suggests that a bond purchase can affect term premia by reducing certain types of risk in the public's hands and therefore reducing the required premium to hold this risk. Portfolio balance arguments about QE most commonly reason that a purchase of long bonds reduces yields by reducing the amount of duration risk in the market. But Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 7 (2011) argue that removing duration is less important than removing certain maturities of very safe assets. This "safety channel" is a version of the portfolio balance channel in which some investors strongly prefer certain maturities of very safe assets.
Either version of the portfolio balance channel predicts larger changes in expected returns to assets that are more similar to those of the purchased asset. In other words, Fed asset purchases that change term premia of purchased assets will also change term premia of related assets to the extent that they are substitutes. Purchases of particular issues may also produce "local supply effects"-i.e., differential price reactions-for purchased and not-purchased securities that have very similar characteristics.
There is strong evidence that unconventional monetary policies influence a broad variety of asset prices through both signaling and portfolio balance channels. Event studies provide much of this evidence. Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011) The effect of unconventional policy is not confined to U.S. bonds. Bauer and Neely (2014) show that a purchase of U.S. bonds can both reduce expected future short rates and the term premia for international substitutes and these effects are stronger on those international bonds that are closer substitutes for U.S. bonds. Unconventional policy announcements also increase stock prices (Kiley 2014) and substantially reduce the foreign exchange value of the USD and international bond yields (Neely 2015) . These boosts to bond and stock prices also affected emerging markets (Bowman, Londono and Sapriza 2015) .
Data

Data collection and definition of variables
We obtain daily lending data from Markit Securities Finance for the 27 months beginning to-maturity, time-since-issuance, and yield-to-maturity. Our sample comprises securities with (1) issue size information in DataStream, (2) time-to-maturity of greater than five years at least once during the sample, (3) mean Available Quantity of greater than $10 million over the sample period, (4) mean Borrowed Quantity greater than $1 million over the sample period, and (5) at least 30 daily observations.
We divide the sample period into four sub-periods: Hereafter, we refer to these four periods as P1-Control, P2-Heart, P3-Announce, and P4-Post, respectively. P1-Control begins January 1, 2008. P2-Heart begins just prior to the spate of events in September 2008. P3-Announce begins with LSAP-B1. P4-Post begins just after LSAP-B4 and ends at the conclusion of QE1 purchases.
All statistical tests are at the 0.05 level or greater unless otherwise stated.
Important QE1 events
By late Table   1 shows a timeline of important events associated with the crisis. Figure 2 shows no overall trend in long yields during P1-Control and P2-Heart, but a substantial decline in the first half of P3-Announce. During P4-Post, Treasury yields trended up while agency yields were stable.
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After initially focusing on restoring dysfunctional financial markets through its lender-of-lastresort role, the Fed soon shifted its attention to stimulating real growth and preventing undesirable disinflation with forward guidance and asset purchases. The FOMC took the first step in asset purchases on November 25, 2008, with a press release that announced plans to purchase $100 billion in government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt and $500 billion in MBS issued by those Table   2 , Panel A, shows the four most important QE1 announcements on which we focus our study. (2013) report that the Fed purchased higher-yield, underpriced securities. Table 3 , Columns 5-7, show that all the characteristics of agency securities purchased differ significantly from those not-purchased. Purchased agencies have a larger issue size, higher coupon rate, lower duration, lower time-to-maturity, and lower yield-to-maturity. In particular, the mean issue size is $4.1 billion for purchased agencies, but only $0.4 billion for not-purchased agencies.
The Fed focused its agency purchases on shorter-duration and underpriced securities (Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack 2011) . Table 2 , which we consider in our study. Table 3 ), it is not surprising to find that they also have a larger Available Quantity and Borrowed Quantity.
Hypotheses development
This section describes hypotheses to test the effects of the LSAP announcements and purchases on the behavior of shorts.
If short sellers are sophisticated investors with more accurate expectations than the riskadjusted expectations of the marginal investor, then such short sellers will cover their short positions prior to announcements, as soon as they come to believe that bond prices will rise. We also examine announcements for which the Fed indicated the possibility of reduced purchases (Section 5.4). For these announcements, we expect either no change or an increase in short interest.
Hypothesis 1a: Short interest declines in the five days prior to LSAP buy announcements.
We further hypothesize that Fed expansionary announcements credibly signal that rates, and therefore short interest will remain low as long as short sellers do not believe bond prices will fall.
14 That is, a credible expansionary announcement will produce further declines in short interest in the days that follow. In addition, we hypothesize that shorts will believe that the Fed intends to keep interest rates low over longer horizons.
Hypothesis 1b: Short interest declines in the five days just after LSAP buy announcements.
Hypothesis 1c: Short interest remains low during the whole P4-Post period.
At the time of the announcements, the Fed typically discloses the type of security (Treasury or agency) and the dollar amount of the forthcoming purchases, but does not disclose specific
CUSIPs. In addition, with the exception of the last QE1 announcement on 3/18/2009 (LSAP-B4), the Fed does not disclose the security characteristics (such as time-to-maturity) of targeted securities at announcement time.
14 Therefore, at the time of the announcement, we expect to see no differences in the reaction of Borrowed Quantity for the securities purchased and notpurchased. That is, we hypothesize that the market either cannot anticipate or is indifferent to which specific securities the Fed will purchase.
Hypothesis 2: There is no difference in short sellers' reactions for securities purchased and not-purchased following the policy announcements.
Sections 5.5 and 5.6 investigate whether purchased and not-purchased securities react differently to announcements and actual transactions.
Although we examine four important buy events in some detail, Section 5.7 also analyzes the extent to which Hypotheses 1a and 1b hold for an extended set of events, including QE1, QE2, MEP, and QE3 announcements.
Empirical results
This section characterizes (1) the shorts' responses to LSAP announcements, (2) any differences in the shorts' responses between securities purchased and not-purchased, and (3) the impact of the purchases on securities purchased and not-purchased.
Did the shorts anticipate the LSAP purchase announcements?
Before turning to Treasuries and agencies, we informally illustrate the power of short investors Figure 4 thus provides preliminary evidence that Hypothesis 1a is correct: Short interest in long bonds appears to have declined prior to LSAP announcements. However, it is important to examine carefully movements around to each announcement to provide more conclusive evidence. decline in short positions (Column (1)). We believe that this decline occurred because short investors anticipated, to some degree, the LSAP-B4 announcement of a very large buy, with purchases of $750 billion in MBS, $100 billion of agencies and $300 billion of Treasuries.
Considering all announcements together, Table 6 , Column (1), shows that Treasuries' short interest declines by a statistically significant 3.79%, on average, prior to the announcements.
The mean percentage decline in agency positions, for all announcements, was even larger than that for Treasuries. Table 6 , Column (3), shows agencies' short interest declines by an average of 5.19% prior to the announcements. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis of no-change in favor of Hypothesis 1a, indicating that sophisticated short sellers reduced their short positions prior to announcements. Table 6 , Column (2) (labeled "After"), shows that Treasuries' Borrowed Quantity declines in the 5-days after each announcement, except the first. For all announcements combined, Borrowed Quantity of Treasuries declines by a statistically significant 3.44%. The Borrowed Quantity of period as t0 to t5. A five-day window allows time for traders to react to the announcement (which sometimes occurs at the end of the day) and for delays in settlement.
How shorts respond just after the purchase announcements
agencies declines, on average, by a statistically significant 5.44% in the five days after each announcement, although the decline for the first announcement is only significant at the 0.1 level.
These results support the hypothesis that shorts cover both Treasury and agency short positions following the LSAP announcements (Hypothesis 1b). That is, the LSAP announcements appear to convince short investors that yields will stay low or decline further.
To ensure that the %ΔBorrowed Quantity is due to shifts in demand and not shifts in supply (i.e., Available Quantity) that result from the LSAP announcements, we regress the five-day %ΔBorrowed Quantity on announcement dummies, for each of the four announcements in Table   2 , and the contemporaneous five-day %ΔAvailable Quantity. Announcement Dummy takes the value of one if the date corresponds with the five-day period before or after an announcement and zero if the date corresponds with the control period (P1-Control). That is, the model we estimate for week w is:
%ΔAvailable Quantity and %ΔBorrowed Quantity are measured over five days. 
Did the shorts reinstate their positions following purchase announcements?
We have demonstrated that shorts reduced their positions prior to announcements that reduced yields / raised bond prices, which is consistent with the view that some shorts anticipated these announcements. We have also shown that shorts further reduced their positions just following the announcements, suggesting that the announcements credibly induced expectations of low yields in the short-term. These findings support Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b, respectively. 
Shorts' reactions to Fed announcements of slowed buying
We also investigate short behavior around Fed announcements that reduce or fail to raise expectations of future expansions ("Slow Events" Evidence in Table 9 confirms this expectation for both Treasuries and agencies. For Treasuries, Borrowed Quantity increases an average of 1.52% and 0.65%, before and after the announcements, respectively. For agencies, Borrowed Quantity increases an average of 0.26% and 0.76%, before and after the announcements, respectively. Only three of the 12 changes in borrowed quantity are negative and the overall changes are positive for both Treasuries and agencies. These results reinforce our view that our proxy for short interest is capturing changes in the sentiment of shorts.
Do announcements affect the Borrowed Quantity of purchased/not-purchased differently?
Table 10 reports the results of Hypothesis 2-that short sellers do not distinguish between purchased and not-purchased securities after policy announcements. For each announcement and for all announcements, for both Treasuries and agencies, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the means of the %∆Borrowed Quantity of purchased versus not-purchased are equal (except for agencies for LSAP-B4). Hence, we find no difference in the short sellers' reactions for securities purchased and not-purchased either before or after the policy announcements, supporting Hypothesis 2. We conclude that shorts either cannot discern or do not care which securities will be purchased around announcement times.
Is there a differential effect on securities purchased and not-purchased following the purchases?
We now shift away from examining behavior around announcements to examining behavior over the entire purchase period. The data on bond purchases are weekly. Table 11 shows the effect of the Fed's purchases on Available Quantity and Borrowed Quantity of agencies at the beginning and end of the purchase period. We restrict our analysis to agencies because the Fed purchased some of almost every Treasury CUSIP during the period of our study. During the purchase period,
Available Quantity declined about 31% and Borrowed Quantity declined about 57%. There is little difference between the declines for securities purchased and not-purchased. Hence, we conclude that there was no difference in the effect of the Fed's unconventional policies on Available Quantity or Borrowed Quantity of securities purchased and not-purchased.
The impact of unconventional monetary policy shocks on Borrowed Quantity for an extended sample
To assess whether our basic conclusions apply to a broader sample, we extend our sample to Columns (1) to (3) of Table 12 show the results of predicting the monetary policy shock (proxied by ∆Yield) with %∆Borrowed Quantity_before. Columns (1) and (2) show that the both the Treasury and agency %∆Borrowed Quantity_before predict the monetary shock with the correct sign and to a statistically significant degree. A change of 1% in Borrowed Quantity before the announcement is related to a ∆Yield of 2.6 bps and 1.1 bps, for Treasuries and agencies, respectively. Because Treasury and agency %∆Borrowed Quantities are significantly correlated (ρ = 0.62) and both are somewhat correlated with the time trend, we orthogonalize the Treasury %∆Borrowed Quantity_before with respect to the agency %∆Borrowed Quantity_before when using both in a joint regression.
19 Column (3) shows that agency %∆Borrowed Quantity_before and the orthogonal component of Treasury %∆Borrowed Quantity_before strongly jointly predict the monetary shock. That is, the results in Table 12 are consistent with our previous findings that shorts reduced their positions in anticipation of monetary policy shocks (Section 1.1). 
Conclusion
In response to the financial and economic crisis resulting from the collapse of the housing Specifically, we examine the behavior of short interest around four LSAP announcements that resulted in unusually large interest rate changes. We find that short interest declined significantly prior to LSAP announcements, confirming that short sellers are sophisticated investors who anticipated the unconventional announcements to some degree. We also find that short interest declined further following the announcements. The fact that short interest continued at lower levels during the remainder of the Great Recession indicates that sophisticated market participants 24 believed that long yields were likely to remain low, either because of economic conditions or unconventional policies.
We then use time series regressions to reexamine these findings in a broader sample of 21 Table 9 . The effect of LSAP announcements of slowed purchases on short interest The Fed made several announcements that indicated reduced purchases or that failed to raise expectations of future expansions. For each announcement, we present the five-day dollar and percentage ΔBorrowed Quantity before and after the announcement. We also present these two variables (1) averaged over these four events, which we label "All Slow Events," and (2) for our P1-Control for the 34 five-day periods for all Treasuries and agencies. Values are in millions of USD based on par value. For Treasuries and agencies, we jointly rank the %ΔBorrowed Quantity for each CUSIP for the control observations and the before-announcement and the after-announcement observations. We test the null hypothesis that the means of the ranks for the two samples are equal against the alternate hypothesis that the means for the announcements decline more and report the p-values. This is equivalent to a Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
